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rer, or on a motion for a more definite statement, 9 or on a
motion to strike 0
In Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airplines Corp., the
Court, speaking of the application of res ipsa loquitur to an
airplane crash, said: "It is obviously desirable to determine
this basic question as near the inception of the actions as
possible.""' And other courts, while recognizing that
res ipsa loquitur relates to burden of proof and sufficiency
of evidence, neverthless hold that it should have and does
have its concomitant rule of pleading.2
In Maryland, the Bench and Bar in general are well
satisfied with the present system of simplified common law
pleading. Two committees of the Court of Appeals over a
period of approximately nine years have seen fit to recom-
mend but one new rule relating solely to pleading.93 The
code forms, now in use for almost a century, have not been
revised nor have new forms been added. Despite the
general excellance of the system, the fact that it may lead
to "barren appeals" and "barren victories" makes fairly de-
batable the question whether some innovations should not
be made.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT AMENDED TO INCLUDE
SUIT AGAINST VESSEL IN MARITIME TORTS
During the 1949 session of the General Assembly of
Maryland, the Maryland "Lord Campbell's Act" was
amended. Article 67, Section 1, of the Maryland Code,
now provides:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect
or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
P State, use of Cherry v. Stewart & Co., supra, n. 75; Cohn v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D. C. Wyo. 1937).
If the doctrine were determined to be applicable, the motion would be
denied; if not applicable, the motion would be sustained. Zichler v. St. Louis
Pub. Ser. Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S. W. 2d 654, 658 (1933); Gebhardt v.
McQuillen, 230 Iowa 181, 297 N. W. 301 (1941).
0Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., (D. C. D. C.), 76 F. Supp.
940, 6 A. L. R. 2d 521 (1948).
1 Ibid., 942.
12 Kaemmerling v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 2 F. 2d 574, 579 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924). See also, Hargett, op. cit., supra, n. 79.
"General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Pleading Rule 1.
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and recover damages in respect thereof, the vessel or
person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued, or the executor or administrator of the said
person who would have been liable in case of death
of the said person who would have been liable, shall
be liable to an action for damages, not withstanding
the death of the person injured, and although the death
shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount in law to felony and if death ensues as a result
of a wrongful act, neglect or default of a vessel, suit
may be brought in rem against said vessel in any court
of competent jurisdiction; provided, however, that any
such action against the executor or administrator of
the said person who would have been liable shall be
commenced within six calendar months after the death
of the said person who would have been liable."'
The amendment of this act (as shown by the portion
italicized above) adds merely the possibility of libeling the
vessel as well as the owners of the vessel in certain cases
of maritime torts. However it suggests the entire problem
of whether the Maryland Act (or any state law for that
matter) can apply to maritime torts, particularly because
such torts are within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States. This problem has had an interesting history
and development.
"It is a singular fact that by the common law the greatest
injury which one man can inflict on another, the taking of
his life, is without a private remedy",2 for at common law
the cause of action died with the person injured.' The rule
in admiralty was the same as the common law and the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of The
Harrisburg,4 held that under the general maritime law as
accepted and received by the maritime nations in general
and by the United States in particular, there was no right
of action in the case of death caused by negligence.' How-
'Md. Laws (1949) Ch. 742.
2 Goodsell v. Hartford & New Haven R. Co., 33 Conn. 51 (1865).
' "The rule is often viewed as a derivative of the formula 'actio personalis
moritur cum persona' a maxim which is one of some antiquity though its
origin is obscure and post-classical." Van Beeck v. Sabin, 300 U.S. 342(1937) Also see 25 C.J.S. 1072, Sec. 13; Lindgren v. U.S., 281 U.S. 38
(1930) State for Use of Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 A. 881(1936) Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 183 A. 569 (1936), cert. den., 298
U.S. 671 (1936).
'119 U.S. 199 (1886).
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Harrisburg there
had been trial court decisions and intimations to the contrary. See Plummer
v. Webb, Fed. Cas. No. 11234, 1 Ware 75 (D. Me. 1825) ; Cutting v. Seabury,
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ever, the Supreme Court went on to hold that where any
one of the states of the United States has a "survival
statute" similar to the English "Lord Campbell's Act",' or,
indeed any act which allows a remedy arising out of negli-
gence causing death, that the admiralty courts will enforce
those statutes wherever the law of the state can be made
applicable.7
In the case of The Corsair," the Supreme Court was con-
fronted for the first time with the problem of whether a
District Court has the power to entertain a libel in rem for
damages incurred by loss of life due to negligence, where
by the local law a right of action survives to the adminis-
trator or relation of the deceased, but no lien is expressly
created by the act. The court, in an excellent opinion,
reviewed all of the English cases preceding and including
The Vera Cruz,9 in which case the law of England was
definitely settled that an action in rem could not be brought
under the English "Lord Campbell's Act". The Supreme
Court, putting great weight on the decision of the Vera Cruz
since almost every state statute was substantially patterned
after the English "Lord Campbell's Act", said:
"A maritime lien is said by writers upon maritime
law to be the foundation of every proceeding in rem in
the Admiralty. In much the larger class of cases, the
lien is given by the General Admiralty law, but in
other instances, such for example as insurance pilotage,
wharfage, and materials furnished in the home port
of the vessel, the lien is given, if at all, by the local law.
As we are to look, then, to the local law in this instance
for the right to take cognizance of this class of cases,
Fed. Cas. No. 3521, 1 Spr. 522 (D. Mass. 1860) ; The Sea Gull, Fed. Cas. No.
12578 (D. Md. 1865) ; David Reeves, Fed. Cas. No. 6,625, 5 Hughes 89 (D.
Md. 1879) ; The Charles Morgan, Fed. Cas. No. 2,618 (D. Ohio 1878); The
City of Brussels, Fed. Cas. No. 2,745 (D. N.Y. 1873).
6 9 & 10 Vic. Ch. XCIII.
7 The Maryland statute giving a right of action for wrongful death may
be enforced in a court of admiralty where the cause of action arises from
a maritime tort; right of jury trial not being indispensable to enforcement
of such cause of action. Maryland v. Miller, 180 Fed. 796 (D. Md. 1910)
modified on other grounds, 194 F. 775 (4th Cir. 1911), cert. den., 225 U.S.
703 (1912) ; State, Use of Szcyczek v. Hamburg Co., 190 Fed. 240 (D. Md.
1911), aff'd., 193 F. 1019 (4th Cir. 1912) ; aff'd., 234 U.S. 63 (1914).
A right of action for a death caused by wrongful act, given by a state
statute, may be enforced in admiralty. The Highland Light, Fed. Cas. No.
6,447 (C.C. Md. 1867) ; State v. Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co., 190
F. 240 (D. Md. 1911), a4ffd., 193 F. 1019 (4th Cir. 1912), aff d., 234 U.S. 63
(1914) ; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).8145 U.S. 335 (1892).
9 10 App. Cas. 59 (1884).
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we are bound to inquire whether the local law gives a
lien upon the offending thing. If it merely gives a right
of action in personam for a cause of action of a mari-
time nature, the District Court may administer the law
by proceedings in personam, . . .but unless a lien be
given by the local law, there is no lien to enforce by
proceedings in rem in the Court of Admiralty."1
"'Lord Campbell's Act' in Maryland was first enacted
by the Maryland Act of 1852, Chapter 299. The original
language imposing liability, which was not substantially
changed until 1949, imposed the liability merely upon the
person who would have been liable if death had not ensued
(or the executor or the administrator of the said person).
The effect of the amendment of Section 1, Article 67, merely
adds the words 'the vessel' to the phrase 'person who would
have been liable' and further provides 'and if death ensues
as a result of wrongful act, neglect or default of a vessel,
suit may be brought in rem against said court of competent
jurisdiction'."".. Thus, due to the recent amendment, the
Maryland statute for the first time imposed liability in rem
on a vessel where death of a person was the result of a
wrongful act, neglect or default of a vessel.
That these state statutes may be the basis of a cause of
action arising out of torts, causing death and occurring
within the admiralty jurisdiction, without violating the
Constitution of the United States, is now almost universally
recognized. 2 However, the law was not always so well
settled on this point. It was early argued (1) that exclusive
power to regulate rights and liabilities within the admiralty
jurisdiction was vested in the federal government, and (2)
that enforcement of state statutes in admiralty would mar
the uniformity of the general maritime law and therefore
to do so would be unconstitutional. The argument that Con-
gress has the exclusive power to legislate over all admiralty
and maritime causes was based on the power of Congress
to regulate commerce 3 and from the clause of the Consti-
"
0The Corsair, 145 U.S. 335, 347 (1892). See also The Anglo-Patagonian,
235 F. 92 (4th Cir. 1916), cert. den., 242 U.S. 636 (1916) ; Lewis v. Jones,
27 F. 2d 72 (4th Cir. 1928) ; Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933).
State, Use of Maines v. A/S Nye Kristianborg & Motor Vessel Bowgran,
1949 A.M.C. 1329, 84 F. Supp. 775 (D. Md. 1949).
12 I BENEDICT, ADmIRALTY (1940), Sec. 148p., 391; RoBiNsON, ADMIRALTY
(1939), Ch. 5, Sec. 16, 137; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
18 U. S. COxsT., Art. 1, Sec. 8. Parenthetically, it is of interest to note that
the Supreme Court of the United States relied on this provision of the Con-
stitution authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce as part of
the basis for extending the jurisdiction of admiralty to Injuries suffered on
land by seamen in connection with their employment. O'Donnell v. Great
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tution extending the judicial power to "all cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction". 4 The argument that Con-
gress has sole power to legislate within the admiralty juris-
diction, however, has been rejected and in Atlantic Fruit
Co. v. Red Cross Line" it was said, "within certain limita-
tions in the absence of congressional action, 'a state law may
give a substantial right of such a character that.., the right
may be enforced in the proper federal tribunal whether it
be a court of equity or admiralty or of common law'."' 6 Like-
wise the argument that a state cannot destroy the sym-
metry of the maritime law by creating maritime rights or
conferring jurisdiction in any particular upon an admiralty
court has been rejected when it was held that use of the
state death acts did not mar the uniformity of the general
maritime law.
17
Lakes D. & D. Co., 1943 A.M.C. 149, 318 U.S. 36 (1943), thus overruling the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in its decision in Rudo v. Bull S.S. Co., 168
Md. 281, 177 A. 538 (1935), cert. den., 295 U.S. 759 (1935), in which the
Maryland Court refused to follow that argument.
"U. S. CONST., Art. 3, Sec. 2.
T276 F. 319 (1921), aff'd., 5 F. 2d 218 (2nd Cir. 1924). See Just v. Cham-
bers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941) saying, "With respect to maritime torts we
have held that the State may modify or supplement the maritime law by
creating liability which a court of admiralty will recognize and enforce
when the state action is not hostile to the characteristic features of the
maritime law or inconsistent with federal legislation." The City of Norwalk,
55 F. 98 (1893) ; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U,.S. 233, 242 (1921);
Great Lakes Dredge Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479 (1923) ; Vancouver
Steamship Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933). See also The Lottawana, 21
Wall 558, 88 U.S. 558 (1874).
Italics supplied.
The Supreme Court in the case of Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S.
233, 240-242 (1921), after reaffirming -the rule that no suit to recover dam-
ages for the death of a human being caused by negligence may be main-
tained in the admiralty courts of the United States under the general mari-
time law stated:
"How far this rule of non-liability adopted and enforced by our
admiralty courts in the absence of an applicable statute may be modified,
changed or supplemented by state legislation has been the subject of
consideration here but no complete solution of the question has been
announced....
"In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Chelentis v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308
and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, we have recently
discussed the theory under which the general maritime law became a
part of our national law, and pointed out the inability of the States to
change its general features so as to defeat uniformity - but the power
of a State to make modifications or supplements was affirmed. And we
further held that rights and liabilities in respect of torts upon the sea
ordinarily depend upon the rules accepted and applied in admiralty
courts which are controlling wherever suit may be instituted. Under
this view, Amer. Steamboat Co. v. Chase and Sherlock v. Alling, sup-
port the right to recover under a local statute in an admiralty court for
death occurring on navigable waters within the State when caused by
tort there committed.
"As the logical result of prior decisions we think it follows that, where
death upon such waters results from a maritime tort committed on
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Thus, in the absence of conflicting congressional legisla-
tion, the Maryland statute may be enforced in the appro-
priate federal 8 or state court. 9
In 1920, Congress enacted the "Death on the High Seas
Act".2" This act provides as follows:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent may maintain a suit for dam-
ages in the district court of the United States, in admi-
ralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife,
husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against
the vessel, person or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued."
In Section 7 of the "Death on the High Seas Act", it is
provided "the provisions of any state statute giving or
regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not
be affected by this chapter." As a result of Sec. 7, the
Federal Act of 1920 does not apply to navigable territorial
waters of a state.2' Under the "Death on the High Seas Act",
an action can be brought either against the person responsi-
ble or against the vessel.22 Thus, at this point, if the cause
of action arose beyond the three-mile limit as provided for
in the Federal Act, the "Death on the High Seas Act" would
be the applicable statute. If the cause of action arose with-
in the territorial waters of Maryland, the suit would have
to be based on the Maryland Act, and here also, since the
1949 amendment, suit may be brought against the offend-
ing person or vessel. However, it must be remembered that
navigable waters within a State whose statutes give a right of action
on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will enter-
tain a libel in peraonam for the damages sustained by those to whom
such right is given. The subject is maritime and local in character and
the specified modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admir-
alty courts, when following the common law, will not work material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor
interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
8upra" (Italics supplied.) See also In Re Clyde S.S. Co., 134 F. 95
(D. N.Y. 1904).
18 See supra, n. 10.
See infra, ns. 24 and 26.
246 U.S.C. 761, et seq.
I BENEDxcT, ADMIRALTY (1940) 375. ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939), Ch. 5,
Secs. 16, 139 and 140.
2The Windrush, 286 Fed. 251 (1922), af'J&, 5 F. 2d 425 (1925).
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if suit is brought, either under the Maryland Act or the
"Death on the High Seas Act", against the vessel, it must
be brought in the Federal Admiralty Courts.23 If suit is
brought against the person, under the Maryland Act, suit
may be brought either in the state court or the federal
court.24 Title 28, of the United States Code, Section 1333
provides:
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the state, of
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which he is otherwise entitled."2
This provision of the judicial code clarifies the existence of
concurrent remedies in the state and federal courts where
the suit is in personam.26
Several months after the passage of the "Death on the
High Seas Act", Congress passed the "Seamen's Act of
1920 "27 commonly called the "Jones Act". This act gave to
"Seamen injured through the negligence of their employers,
and to their personal representatives, where the injuries
result in death, the rights given to railway employees and
their personal representatives by the 'Employers' Liability
Act of 1908' and its amendments"." In effect the act created
a cause of action either for injury to a seaman or death to
a seaman caused by the negligence of the employer. This
cause of action is in personam only and thus can be brought
I BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (1940) 38, "The right to proceed in rem is the
distinctive remedy of the admiralty and hence administered exclusively by
the United States courts in admiralty .. " Also see The Moses Taylor,
4 Wall 411, 431 (U.S. 1866) ; Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219
F. 763 (D. N.J. 1915).
"Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. 522 (1872).
SThe "saving to suitors" clause in sees. 41(3) and 371(3) of Title 28
U.S.C. (1940 ed.) was recently changed by the 1948 session of Congress by
substituting the words "any other remedies to which he is otherwise en-
titled" for the words "the right of a c.l. remedy when the c.l. is competent
to give it'. In 1949, Congress amended Sec. 1333 to its present form "saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled".
2 Jurisdiction of the federal court is not exclusive where the relief sought
is purely in personam. N. Pa. Sea Products Co. v. Nieder, 137 Wash. 85, 241
Pac. 682 (1925). A cause of action for death under a state statute is with-
in the savings clause though not based on the common law, Perry v. Stans-
field, 278 Mass. 563, 180 N.E. 514 (1932).
46 U.S.C. 688.
'S ROBINsoN, ADmIRALTY (1940) 312. Also see Black Gull, 82 F. 2d 758
(2nd Cir. 1936), cert. den., 298 U.S. 684 (1935); Escandon v. Pan Amer.
Foreign Corp., 88 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1937), affg., 12 F. Supp. 1006 (1935).
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in either the state or federal court.29 The "Jones Act", how-
ever, has a limiting effect on the Maryland statute. In
Lindgren v. U.S.A. and Colonna's Shipyard, Inc.,3 ° it was
said by the Supreme Court of the United States that "...
we conclude that the Merchant Marine Act - adopted by
Congress in the exercise of its paramount authority in refer-
ence to the maritime law and incorporating in that law the
provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act - estab-
lishes as a modification of the prior maritime law a rule of
general application in reference to the liability of owners
of vessels for injuries to seamen extending territorially as
far as Congress can make it go; that this operates uniformly
within all of the States and is as comprehensive of those
instances in which by reference to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act it excludes liability, as of those in which lia-
bility is imposed; and that, as it covers the entire field of
liability for injuries to seamen, it is paramount and exclu-
sive, and supersedes the operation of all state statutes deal-
ing with that subject". Under the Lindgren decision all
suits by the personal representatives of a seaman against
an employer based on negligence causing the death must be
brought under the "Jones Act" whenever the tort occurred
within the navigable territorial waters of the state. The
court in the Lindgren case clearly stated that the effect of
the "Jones Act" upon the "Death on the High Seas Act"
was not under consideration and inferior federal courts
and state courts have subsequently allowed suits involving
seaman-employer relationship to be maintained under the
"Death on the High Seas Act" whenever that act would
otherwise be applicable. 31 It may be said that the Mary-
'State courts have jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts to
enforce the right of action established by the "Jones Act". Engel v. Daven-
port, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) ; Panama R.R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926).
No suit in rem will lie under the "Jones Act". Black Gull, 82 F. 2d 758
(2nd Cir. 1936) ; Baymead, 88 F. 2d 144 (9th Cir. 1937). "Under sec. 33 of
the 'Jones Act', the cause of action for negligence may at the election of
the seaman be brought either in admiralty in the federal court (Just v.
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S. Ct. 687, 85 L. Ed. 903; Panama R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 390, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748) or at law in the
federal court (De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 63 S. Ct.
814, 87 L. Ed. 1065; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391,
68 L. Ed. 748), or at law in the state court (Garret v. Moore McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239; Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson,
278 U.S. 130, 138, 49 S. Ct. 75, 73 L. Ed. 220)." McDonald v. Cape Cod
Trawling Co., 71 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
1930 A.M.C. 399, 281 U.S. 38, 46 (1930).
Suit may be brought under the Death on the High Seas act even though
seaman-employer relationship is involved: The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399
(D. Mass. 1947), 1947 A.M.C. 1623; The Alice May (D. Mass.) 1944 A.M.C.
392; The Mohawk (N.Y.) 1938 A.M.C. 396, 2 N.Y. Supp. 2d 309.
The following cases allowed a suit based on the "Death on the High
Seas Act" to be maintained in the state courts: The Juneal, 1938 A.M.C.
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land Act may be resorted to when the negligent act caus-
ing the death occurred within the navigable territorial
waters of the State of Maryland and the relationship of the
parties involved was not that of seaman and employer or
that of stevedore and employer.2
Soon after the amendment to Article 67, Section 1, of
the Maryland Code went into effect, the question arose
whether or not the amendment was to act retroactively.
In State of Maryland v. A/S Nye Kristianborg and M/V
Bowgran,33 Judge Chesnut, sitting in the District Court of
Maryland, after recognizing that this was a problem of first
impression, held - "that the amendment is, under Mary-
land and federal law, prospective and cannot validly be
made retroactive in effect", since it affected substantive
rights and did not merely change procedure. Judge Chesnut
based his opinion firstly on the fictional concept which en-
dows the ship with a personality stating "it seems to follow
logically enough that when the amendment imposed upon
the ship a liability not heretofore existing and further sub-
jected the ship to a proceeding in rem to enforce that lia-
bility the substantive law was thereby changed. According
to American admiralty law the conceptual origin of the
maritime lien resulted from the personification of the ship
as a judicial entity. So viewed it seems clear enough that
a new substantive right was given the libellant, and a new
substantive liability was imposed upon the ship as a per-
sonified entity." Secondly, that apart from the fictional
concept of personification a very substantial reason for
holding that the substantive law is changed by the amend-
ment is the fact that the amendment imposes liability on a
vessel itself for a wrongful act, neglect or default notwith-
794, 4 N.Y. Supp. 2d 9 (1938) ; Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315
(1946); Wyman v. Pan Amer. Airways, Inc., (N.Y.) 1941 A.M.C. 912.
The following cases allowed a suit based on the "Death on the High
Seas Act" to be maintained on the civil side of the federal court: Choy v.
Pan American Airways Co., (D. So. D. N.Y.) 1941 A.M.C. 483; The Four
Sisters, supra.
The following cases have construed the "Death on the High Seas Act"
to mean the suit must be maintained In the Federal Admiralty Courts: The
Mohawk, 1938 A.M.C. 396, 2 N.Y. Supp. 2d 309; Dall v. Cosulich, (S.D. N.Y.)
1936 A.M.C. 359; The Chicago & Silverpalm, 1935 A.M.C. 1506, 79 F. 2d
598 (C.C.A. 9) ; Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 1934 A.M.C. 649, 654, 5 F.
Supp. 238, (S.D. N.Y. 1934), mod. C.C.A. 70 F. 2d 326 (1934), cert. den., 293
U.S. 577 (1934).
"In general, rights between stevedore-employer are governed by the
"Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers Compensation Act", 33 U.S.C. 901, et
seq., and the "State Workmen's Compensation Acts", Md. Code Supp. (1949),
Art. 101.
1949 A.M.C. 1329, 84 F. Supp. 775, 780, (D. Ct. Md. 1949).
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standing there may be no fault or personal liability on the
part of the shipowner.
Whether or not the amendment is retroactive in effect
it will serve the purpose of filling a void in the admiralty
law applicable to torts occurring within this state but which
were in the admiralty jurisdiction. Let us suppose that a
collision between two vessels occurs within the navigable
territorial waters of the State of Maryland causing death
to individuals aboard the innocent vessel. Also assume that
the offending vessel is sailing under a foreign flag. The
"Death on the High Seas Act" would not apply since the
wrong occurred within the territorial waters of a state.
Nor would the "Jones Act" be applicable since the wrong-
doer was not the employer of the deceased persons. There-
fore it would be necessary to rely on the Maryland wrongful
death statute. Prior to its amendment, suit could only be
brought against the owner or operator of the vessel since
the statute provided no lien against the ship. If the owner
or operator of the vessel sailing under a foreign flag, had
no office or agent here and was not doing business here,
then there is no way of enforcing the in personam cause of
action except by going to the place where the owner or
operator resides, or does business, which may be in some
foreign country and attempt to file suit under our law. The
expense, difficulty and hardships involved in many cases
would deter those who had been dependent upon deceased
from enforcing their in personam remedy. Now that our
statute is broad enough to provide for a suit in rem against
the offending vessel as well as a suit in personam against
the owner or operator of the offending vessel, this injustice
would be remedied. At small expense and with little hard-
ship or difficulty, the dependent relatives of deceased could
enforce their remedy by libeling the vessel while it is still
within the territorial waters of Maryland.
This illustration shows the need for the amendment
recently passed by the Maryland legislature and which has
been in effect since June 1, 1949. It will prevent persons
from using Maryland waters, committing wrongs and then
going off "scot-free".
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